INTRODUCTION
ECONOMISTS HAVE LONG DEBATED whether it makes more sense to think of firms as choosing prices or quantities as strategic variables.2 In a world with uncertainty, however, a firm may not want to commit to either of these simple types of strategy, nor can all decisions be deferred until the resolution of the uncertainty. Adjustment costs and the problems of organizational communication mean that decisions about the size and structure of the organization, the organization's values, and the decision rules to be followed by lower-level managers must be made in advance. These decisions implicitly determine a supply function that relates the quantity the firm will sell to the price the market will bear. Such a supply function allows the firm to adapt better to changing conditions than does a simple commitment to a fixed price or a fixed quantity, come what may.
For example, if a consulting firm sticks to a fixed rate per hour, it is fixing a price (perhaps subject to a capacity constraint). In fact, however, even when firms quote fixed rates, the real price often varies. When business is slack, more hours vation systems approximately implement a supply function without complete observations of demand.5
Any equilibrium concept requires some story about how firms adjust to uncertainty. For example, in a stochastic Cournot game, firms must adjust their prices to the realization of demand, and in a stochastic Bertrand game, firms must adjust their quantities. Only in a supply function equilibrium, however, do firms adjust to the uncertainty in an optimal manner given their competitors' behavior-with stochastic Cournot or Bertrand, firms would wish to alter their behavior after learning something about demand.
To summarize, our goal in this paper is to provide as realistic as possible a model of oligopolistic competition in a static (one-shot) setting. Our belief is that the model we provide better represents oligopoly behavior than standard singleperiod Bertrand or Cournot models.6 Section 2 shows why there is a multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions in the absence of uncertainty.7 Section 3 is the core of the paper. It presents the formal analysis of supply function equilibria under uncertainty. We begin with symmetric duopolists producing a homogeneous good in a market where an exogenous one-dimensional shock causes a horizontal translation of the demand 5The Wall Street Journal (August 24, 1984) quotes Delta's manager of system marketing as saying, "We don't have to know if a balloon race in Albuquerque or a rodeo in Lubbock is causing an increase in demand for a flight." A computer program chooses quantities of different categories of discount seats, gets an estimate of demand by comparing reservation levels with historical patterns, adjusts the quantities of discount seats according to the estimate, re-estimates demand, etc. Here sales are made in the process of adjusting to the demand shock. However, we know (Myerson (1981) , Bulow and Roberts (1987) ) that any (single-or multi-stage) mechanism that a monopolist uses to sell a fixed number of tickets to the highest-reservation-price buyers (and that gives any non-buyer zero expected surplus) yields the same expected revenue. Therefore, provided the oligopolists' ticketing systems are symmetrically programmed (in equilibrium), any process by which they sell a total of Q tickets to the Q highest-reservation-price customers yields each firm the same expected revenue as if they had sold all Q tickets in a Q + lth price auction and shared the revenues. Thus, from firms' point of view, the approximation of the ticketing process to the implementation of a supply function equilibrium in which sales are made only at the market-clearing prices may be a good one. 6 A more complete model of oligopoly should probably involve a multistage game. Even with a single time period in which goods are delivered (e.g., single airline flight or period in which consulting services are provided), adjustment to uncertainty may involve sequential sales and production decisions in response to (possibly imperfect) observations of competitors' behavior.
7In the model of Section 2, competition in supply functions is equivalent to competition in reaction functions: any supply function for i determines the output for i that would clear the market given an output for j, and any such reaction function, coupled with the demand curve, determines a relationship between i 's quantity and price. (See Hart (1985) .) Also representable as models of supply function competition are models in which owners design incentive contracts relating their managers' compensation to competitors' profits and/or sales as well as to the firm's own profits and perhaps sales. (A manager will maximize his salary given his incentive contract and is assumed to know the contracts of the rival manager at the time he makes production or pricing decisions. In this setting, owner i's choice of incentive contract for his manager simply determines the output manager i will choose as a function of the other firm's output, that is, the contract determines firm i's reaction function.) Although uniqueness of equilibrium can be obtained under certainty by restricting the form of contracts (see Vickers (1985) and curve. We demonstrate existence of a supply function equilibrium for unbounded support of the uncertainty and show for this case that in any equilibrium, supply functions are symmetric across firms and upward-sloping. We give conditions under which equilibrium is unique; an example of uniqueness is provided by the case of linear demand and linear marginal cost.8 We present general comparative statics propositions (one of which extends our results to a symmetric oligopoly of any size) and illustrate them using the linear model. Changes in the environment affect not only the levels but also the slopes of firms' supply functions, and hence affect whether competition is more like Cournot competition (in which firms are constrained to compete with fixed quantities, that is, vertical supply functions) or Bertrand competition (in which firms compete with fixed prices, that is, horizontal supply functions). The extension to differentiated products is sketched in Section 4. Section 5 presents some interpretations and concluding observations.
SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT UNCERTAINTY
We begin by showing why there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria in continuous, twice differentiable supply functions in an undifferentiated products duopoly in the absence of uncertainty.
The industry demand curve is Q = D(p). Define p as the price such that D( )=0, and assume that D(.) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave on (0, p). The firms have identical cost functions C(.), with C'(q) 2 0 and C"(q) > 0 for all q > 0. A strategy for firm k (k = i, j) is a twice continuously differentiable function mapping price into a level of output for k: Sk: [0, p) -(-00, o0). Allowing firms (in principle) to choose supply functions specifying negative quantities makes no difference to our results but will slightly simplify the analysis in Section 3 by making residual demand curves everywhere differentiable. Firms i and j choose supply functions simultaneously. Provided that there is a unique price p* such that D( p*) = Si( p*) + Si( p*), that is, industry demand matches the total amount firms are willing to supply, firms sell S'(p*) and Sj(p*) at p*, earning profits p*Si(p*) -C(Si(p*)) and p*Sj(p*) -C(Sj(p*)). We assume that if a market-clearing price does not exist, or is not unique, then no production takes place and firms' profits are zero. This assumption ensures that such an outcome will not arise in equilibrium, but the assumption does not constrain firms' behavior in any important way-the equilibria we examine remain equilibria under any reasonable alternative assumption about firms' 8The spirit of this analysis is similar to that of our (1986) paper: we show there that the presence of exogenous uncertainty can give firms strict preferences between setting price and setting quantity ex ante and, as a consequence, can lead to a unique equilibrium in a game in which firms can choose between these two types of strategic variable. Other examples of introducing uncertainty to refine a continuum of Nash equilibria include Nash's (1953) and Binmore's (1987) selection of a unique equilibrium in Nash's demand game and Saloner's (1982) and Matthews and Mirman's (1983) selection of an equilibrium in a limit-pricing game.
payoffs when the market-clearing price is not unique.9 We confine attention to pure strategy Nash equilibria in supply functions: such an equilibrium consists of a pair of functions S'( p) and SJ(p) such that Sk(-) maximizes k's profits given that m chooses Sm(.), k, m = i, j, m 0 k. Consider a strictly positive output pair (4i, 4j) at which the market price p= D-1(4i + qj) exceeds each firm's marginal cost C'(4k), k = i, j. To support this point as an equilibrium outcome, we seek a pair of supply functions SI(.) and Si(.) passing through (p, qi) and (ji, qj), respectively, and such that qi is a profit-maximizing point along i's residual demand curve and similarly for j. Given S'( p), i finds its profit-maximizing price along its residual demand curve Global profit maximization at p is also ensured by any increasing, twice 9In the absence of uncertainty, a firm can always achieve its profit-maximizing point along its residual demand curve by choosing a supply function that crosses the residual demand curve only at that point. See Section 3 for further discussion.
continuously differentiable supply functions that at p are tangent to the linear supply functions and that for all other prices specify outputs that are positive and larger than the linear ones. Furthermore, since when both firms use increasing supply functions, the market-clearing price is unique, condition (ii) is satisfied as well. Thus, the output pair (qi, q4j) can be supported by an infinite number of supply function pairs with each element of a pair a best response to the other. This result can be generalized to other output pairs by modifying the way in which the supply functions that at p are locally best responses to each other are extended over the domain [0, p). While we do not have a general algorithm for satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), we can satisfy them and support with families of supply functions any pair (qi, qj) that is symmetric or not too asymmetric.10'11 Furthermore, our construction generalizes straightforwardly to more than two firms or to differentiated products.
The multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions stems from the fact that the slope of S'(*) through (p, qj) ensures that (p, qj) is the point along i 's residual demand where i's marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. Since in the absence of exogenous uncertainty, i's residual demand is certain, then as long as the global second-order conditions are satisfied, any supply function for i that intersects its residual demand just once, at (pf, qi), is an optimal response to Si(-). Thus, i is willing to choose a supply function with a slope through (p, q4) that ensures that ( -, qj) is profit-maximizing along j's residual demand. Given this, j is willing to choose SJ(-). In the next section we introduce exogenous uncertainty about demand, which makes firms' residual demands uncertain and so gives them strict preferences over the outputs specified by their supply functions for a range of prices; consequently, the set of outcomes supportable by supply function equilibria is dramatically reduced.
SUPPLY FUNCTION EQUILIBRIA UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In a world with exogenous uncertainty about, say, demand, a firm has a set of profit-maximizing points-one for each realization of the uncertainty-even when it knows its competitor's (pure strategy) equilibrium behavior. In this setting, a firm can generally achieve higher expected profits by committing to a supply function than by committing to a fixed price or a fixed quantity, because a supply function allows better adaptation to the uncertainty. Furthermore, by reducing the set of optimal supply functions for each firm to a single element, uncertainty can dramatically pare the set of supply function equilibria, even to a unique equilibrium. We now define and characterize equilibria in supply functions in the presence of exogenous demand uncertainty for the symmetric undifferentiated products duopoly model of Section 2. Our analysis is generalized to the case of n ? 2 firms in Propositions 8a and 8b. By restricting attention to symmetric firms, we can show that asymmetric equilibria do not exist and can characterize symmetric equilibria by solving a single differential equation; with asymmetric firms, characterization of equilibria would require solving a system of coupled differential equations. Differentiated products are discussed in Section 4.
Let industry demand be subject to an exogenous shock E, where E is a scalar random variable with strictly positive density everywhere on the support [ implemented by each firm producing at a point (p*(E), Sk(p*(E))) such that D(p*(E)) = Si(p*(E)) + SJ(p*(E)), that is, demand matches total supply, provided a unique such price p*(E) exists. As in Section 2, we assume that if a market-clearing price does not exist, or is not unique, then firms earn zero profits. Again this assumption ensures that such an outcome will not arise in equilibrium, but the assumption is not an important constraint on firms' behavior. Our assumptions about demand and costs ensure that the set of ex post profit-maximizing points for each firm as its residual demand curve varies, when the other firm is using a potential equilibrium strategy, can be described by a supply function which intersects each residual demand curve once and only once. Hence, as long as an alternative assumption about the consequences of multiple intersections between supply functions and residual demand curves does not give firms higher profits than in the most profitable of the points of intersection, our equilibria remain equilibria. Furthermore, there are no supply functions tracing through ex post profit-maximizing points as E varies that are equilibria under an 12Restricting firms to choosing supply functions specifying nonnegative quantities at all prices, but not insisting on differentiability at the price axis, would lead to the same results but would slightly complicate the analysis by permitting the possibility that residual demand curves are not differentiable everywhere. alternative assumption but not under our assumption. Therefore, modifying our assumption about multiple intersections would not affect the set of equilibria we examine in our propositions.
We focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria in supply functions: such an equilibrium consists of a pair of functions S'(p) and SJ(p) such that Sk(.) maximizes k's expected profits, where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of e, given that m chooses Sm(.), k, m = i, j, m # k. We confine attention to twice continuously differentiable supply functions. Firm i's residual demand at any price is the difference between industry demand and the quantity that j is willing to supply at that price. Thus if j is committed to the supply function SJ( p), i's residual demand curve is D(p, e) -SJ(p). Since e is a scalar, the set of profit-maximizing points along i's residual demand curves as e varies is a one-dimensional curve in price-quantity space. If this curve can be described by a supply function qi = S'(p) that intersects each realization of i's residual demand curve once and only once, then by committing to Si(.), i can achieve ex post optimal adjustment to the shock. In this case, S1(*) is clearly i's unique optimal supply function in response to SJ(.). We assume now that the set of ex post profit-maximizing points for i can be described by a supply function and show later that under our hypotheses there exist equilibria in which this is indeed the case.
Given this assumption, in solving for i's optimal supply function, we can replace the maximization of expected profits by the maximization with respect to p of profits for each realization of e. Firm i solves
(1) maxp[D(p, )-S'(p)] -C(D(p,e)-SS(p)). p The first-order condition is (2) D(p, e) -S'(p) + [p -C'(D(p, E)-Si(p))]
[DP(P, E) S(P) = 0.
If (1) is globally strictly concave in p (second-order conditions will be checked later), then (2) implicitly determines i's unique profit-maximizing price p'(e) for each value of e; the corresponding profit-maximizing quantity is D(pO(e),?)-S'(p'(E))
qo(E). The functions po(e) and qo(e) represent in parameterized form i's set of ex post optimal points as its residual demand curve shifts; if po(e) is invertible (invertibility will also be checked later), this locus can be written as a function from price to quantity: qi = S'(p)= q((p0)-1(p)). Since De> 0, no two realizations of i's residual demand curve can intersect; this condition, together with uniqueness of po(e) for each E, implies that S'(p) intersects i's residual demand curve once and only once for each E, at po(e). Hence S'(p) is i's optimal supply function in response to Si(p).
Let us rewrite (2) so that it implicitly defines the function Si(p). Replace q1o(e) D(pO(e), E) -SJ(pO(e)) by Si(p) and use e(Q, p) as defined above to replace DP(p?(e), e) by DP(p, e(S1(p) + Si(p), p)), SO (2) becomes (3) S'(p) + [p-c'(s(p))] [D(p, e(S'(p) + Si(p), p))
-Si( p)I -0.
We begin by considering symmetric equilibria and will then show that no asymmetric equilibria exist. In a symmetric equilibrium S1(p) = S'(p) S(p) so (3) becomes, after some rearrangement,
(4) S'(P) = 8C(p(P)) + DP (p, e(2S(p), p)) -f(p, S(p)).
Henceforth, except where indicated otherwise, we assume that DP= 0 for all (p, e), i.e., demand is translated horizontally by the shock e. Then if we write Dp( p, e(2S( p), p)) simply as Dp( p), (4) becomes the differential equation
S () S'(p)= C'( S) + P) j-f (p, S).

Given a function S(.) that intersects ?D(p, e) at a unique point for each E E [e, ?], define p as the solution to S(p) = 'D(p, e) and p as the solution to S(p) = 'D( p, i). In any equilibrium involving symmetric, differentiable supply functions S(-) that trace through each firm's ex post profit-maximizing points, S(-) must satisfy (5) for all p E [p, p].13 Conversely, if for all e E [f, -], there is a unique price at which 2S( p) = D(p, e) and if S(-) satisfies (5) for all p E [p, p] as well as appropriate second-order conditions, then S(*) is a supply function equilibrium (SFE).
The differential equation (5) is just the symmetric version of the pair of first-order conditions developed in Section 2 to construct a supply function equilibrium in the absence of uncertainty. The role of uncertainty is simply to necessitate that the first-order conditions hold at every price which for some realization of e clears the market.
The nonautonomous first-order differential equation (5) can be rewritten as
(6) p'(S) =r(S, p)--(p,) or as the two-dimensional autonomous system (7) S'(t) = S + Dp(p)(p -C(S)) p'(t) =p -C'(S)
. While the derivation of (5) above assumed that firms use as strategies functions from price to quantity, the system of equations (7) would in fact emerge from a more general analysis which allowed firms to choose any one-dimensional manifold relating price to quantity. Each trajectory solving (5) (or (6) or (7)) is a locus 13For all solutions to (5) above the marginal cost curve, p <p. We are suppressing the dependence of p and p upon S for notational simplicity. of points satisfying each firm's first-order condition for profit maximization as e varies, when its rival is committed to producing somewhere along the same locus. Some of these trajectories can be expressed as functions S(p), while others cannot. Any trajectory that solves the differential equation in the region corresponding to possible realizations of the demand curve, and that satisfies appropriate second-order conditions as well, is a Nash equilibrium in one-dimensional price-quantity manifolds.
Our description of our model as representing competition in supply functions, rather than competition in supply manifolds, is justified by the following result, demonstrated in Proposition 1 below. Any trajectory solving (5) that cannot be expressed as a function S( p) will, for large enough uncertainty about demand, violate the second-order conditions. Therefore, for unbounded support of the uncertainty, not only are our equilibria in supply functions equilibria in supply manifolds, but they are the only equilibria in supply manifolds that trace through each firm's ex post optimal points.
We now characterize the solutions to (5) through a series of claims, whose proofs are in the Appendix. 
has full support (E = e(O, 0), E= S( -) is a symmetric SFE tracing through ex post optimal points if and only if for all p >0 , S(-) satisfies (5) and 0< S'(p) < xc.
PROOF: Sufficiency: Since 0 < S'( p) < oc for all p > 0, total supply intersects total demand at a unique point for each 6. Since S(-) satisfies (5) for all p > 0, the first-order condition for ex post profit maximization is satisfied everywhere along S( ) when the other firm commits to the same supply function. The conditions on S(.) and S'(-) together imply, using (10), that 7pp p, 6; S(-)) < 0 for all p > 0 and for all 6 > e(0, 0), so the global second-order conditions for ex post profit-maximization are satisfied everywhere along S(*). Therefore, S(-) is a symmetric SFE tracing through ex post optimal points. Necessity: Satisfaction of (5) for all p > 0 is a necessary condition for a supply function defined for all p > 0 to trace through ex post optimal points when the other firm commits to the same supply function. To show that 0 < S'( p) < x is also a necessary condition, we show that if, for some p, S(*) ever crosses either f = 0 from below or f = ox from the left, S(-) must eventually violate the second-order conditions.
Once a trajectory S( * ) crosses f = 0 from below, S' becomes and stays negative (by Claims 1 and 3) and, from (A2) in the Appendix, S" also becomes and stays negative (for S > 0). Therefore the trajectory will eventually intersect the S = 0 axis at a point (po, 0) with po > C'(0), where by (5), S'( po) = f( po, 0) = DP( po).
Substitution into (10) shows that rpp(po, 6; S(.)) = 5-'(po) > 0. Thus, for 6 = e(0, po) (the value of 6 for which (po, 0) satisfies i 's first-order condition), (po, 0) is a local minimum-profit point for i. Therefore, S(.) cannot be a SFE.
Once a trajectory S(-) crosses f = ox from the left, S' becomes and stays negative, so the trajectory must eventually go below firm i's (upward-sloping) average cost curve and so include points at which i's profits are negative. Such points cannot be optimal for any values of -, so the trajectory cannot represent an equilibrium. (Note that such a trajectory cannot in any case be represented as a supply function, but this argument establishes that it could not even be part of an equilibrium in supply manifolds.)
Q.E.D.
With this characterization of a symmetric SFE, we can now prove an existence result.
PROPOSITION 2 (Existence): Assume E has full support. There exists a SFE tracing through ex post optimal points. The set of symmetric equilibria consists either of a single trajectory or of a connected set of trajectories, i.e. a set such that, for any two trajectories in the set, all trajectories (solving (5)) that lie everywhere between these trajectories are also in the set. Section 2 showed that a range of asymmetric supply function equilibria, supporting asymmetric outputs, exists in the absence of uncertainty. Without uncertainty, an outcome (pf, qj, q4) is supported by supply functions with slopes at p, S`( pi) and SJ'(P), determined by evaluating the right-hand sides of (9a) and (9b) at p (noting that S'(f ) = qi and SJ(P) = q4j); at all other prices, the supply functions need only ensure that p-is profit-maximizing for both firms and is the unique market-clearing price. In contrast, with demand uncertainty whose support has lower bound e(0, 0), equilibrium supply functions must satisfy (9a) and (9b) over a range of prices extending down to zero. Since no asymmetric solutions to (9a) and (9b) are profit-maximizing over this whole range of prices, no asymmetric SFE exists.
Contrast with Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
The SFE's for unbounded support of the uncertainty have finite positive slope and so are distinct from the vertical supply functions that are exogenously imposed on firms in the Cournot model and from the horizontal supply relations exogenously imposed in the Bertrand model. A fixed price or a fixed quantity can never be an equilibrium strategy when marginal costs are upward sloping. To understand this, observe that if firm j were to commit to a fixed quantity, i's residual demand for any E would simply be the industry demand curve translated horizontally. As the additive shock varies, the set of i's residual demands coincides with the set of market demands for a monopolist. For a monopolist, the locus of profit-maximizing points as E varies is precisely the f = 0 locus (as can be checked from the monopolist's first-order condition); by Claim 1 this locus has positive slope. Similarly, if firm j were to commit to a fixed price pj > 0, the set of residual demand curves for i would all be flat at -, zero above p , and identical to the set of industry demand curves below -j3. Firm i's best response supply function would then be identical to that of a monopolist for low realizations of demand, and so have finite positive slope for p < jI-. (If p-j = 0, firm i cannot earn positive profits, so given that C"(0) > 0, i prefers to commit to a quantity of zero.) We know from Proposition 3 that no asymmetric equilibria exist.
In the limit as the marginal cost curve becomes flat, Bertrand behavior becomes an equilibrium: if firm j commits to a fixed price equal to the constant marginal cost, firm i cannot earn positive profits so can do no better than to adopt the same strategy. In the limit as the marginal cost curve becomes steeper and approaches the vertical axis, supply function equilibrium behavior approaches a fixed quantity of zero. Under the assumptions of our model, which rule out these extremes, neither a fixed price nor a fixed quantity can ever represent an equilibrium adaptation to uncertainty.
In any SFE for unbounded support of e, the outcome corresponding to any given value of E is intermediate between the outcome that would arise if firms learned E and then competed in the Cournot fashion and the outcome that would arise if they observed E and then competed using Bertrand strategies. This claim is demonstrated using Figure 2 We note that given the nature of the uncertainty and its support, the SFE are independent of the distribution of the uncertainty, remaining unchanged even as the distribution becomes more and more sharply peaked at a specific point and approaches the no-uncertainty case. When a SFE under a natural kind of uncertainty is unique, therefore, it may be a natural candidate for the correct SFE in the limiting case of no uncertainty. 16The Cournot outcome has each firm selling E/(3 + mc) and the Bertrand outcome has each firm charging a price Eic/(2 + mc), where E is the known value of E. In fact, there is a range of Nash equilibria in prices, but Ec/(2 + mc) is the Bertrand price selected by the arguments of footnote 14.
Whether or not the SFE is unique depends on the behavior of the marginal cost and demand curves for large S and p. Changing C'(S) over a bounded domain [S, S] or changing Dp(p) over a bounded domain [p, p-I does not
Comparative Statics
We present a series of propositions detailing the comparative statics of the SFE and use the linear model to illustrate the results.
For Propositions 5 through 8b, assume that e has full support and that the SFE is unique. With quantity (S) on the horizontal axis and price (p) on the vertical axis, we will say that a function is steeper at S if Ip'(S) is larger or, equivalently, I S'( p) I is smaller. 1, 2, and 3) . Therefore, this trajectory is the unique SFE in the perturbed model (by Proposition 1).
Suppose that C'(S) is increased on (SO, Sl). For S e (SO, Sl), the new SFE must lie everywhere strictly above the original SFE: if at some S E (So, S1) it were on or below the original equilibrium trajectory, then, since C'(S) is now higher, we know from (5) that the new trajectory would be flatter at S than the old one. It follows from (5) that the new trajectory would be strictly below the old one at Sl, and since the original SFE is unique, the new trajectory would eventually cross the f= oo locus, thus invalidating it as an equilibrium.
Suppose SO # 0. For S < SO, the trajectories solving (5) are unaffected by the change in C'(S) above SO. Since the new equilibrium lies strictly above the old one for S E (SO, Si), it must also be strictly higher at SO, and therefore for S E (0, SO], the new equilibrium trajectory must be higher and steeper (smaller S') than the original. Since SO > 0, C"(0) is unchanged, so the slope of the SFE at the origin is unchanged (by Claim 6).
The arguments for a downwards shift in the marginal cost curve are parallel. If SO= 0, then by Claim 6 the slope of the SFE at the origin, S'(0), is unchanged, decreased, or increased according as C" (0) For Proposition 7, we relax the assumption that Dpe, 0 and consider what happens to the SFE when, for an interval of e values, the effect of the shock is to rotate the demand curve as well as to translate it horizontally. For this more general environment, the fundamental differential equation is now (4). We have stated Propositions 5, 6, and 7 for the case where the changes occur over a bounded domain (Si, Pl, and el are finite). In this case, the new SFE is unique and coincides with the original SFE beyond a certain point. If Sl, Pl, or E1 is infinite, then the SFE in the perturbed model may not be unique; however, except at the origin, all of the equilibria lie everywhere strictly above the original SFE, for an increase in C'(S) or Dp(p, e), or everywhere strictly below, for a decrease in C'(S) or Dp(p, E). The results of this proposition apply to the change from monopoly to duopoly as well as to changes to larger numbers of firms: a monopolist's optimal supply function can be shown to coincide with the f= 0 locus for the duopoly model, so the comparison follows from Claim 1 and Proposition 1.
Adding firms with the same marginal cost curve lowers industry marginal cost (the marginal cost of the industry producing one extra unit) for every level of industry output, and so biases our results towards larger industry outputs and lower prices as the number of firms increases. An alternative approach gives each firm marginal cost curve C(S) = C'(nS) when the industry contains n firms, so that the industry marginal cost curve is independent of n (it is C'(S) = Cn'(S/n)). Like Proposition 8a, Proposition 8b applies to the change from monopoly to duopoly as well as to changes to larger numbers of firms.
Under the assumptions of Proposition Sb, entry into the industry increases industry supply, though not necessarily each firm's output, at any given price. Industry profits decrease monotonically and social welfare (the sum of profits and consumer surplus) increases monotonically as n increases, and price falls. When, however, as in Proposition 8a, increasing n reduces industry marginal costs, industry profits need not monotonically decrease in n, although social welfare must increase in n. In this case, increasing n increases each firm s supply at each price. This function is steeper, the steeper is marginal cost (higher c) and the steeper is demand (lower m). Now suppose that either c increases or m decreases in an oligopoly. Since each firm is a monopolist with respect to its residual demand, its optimal supply function becomes steeper, for given supply function choices by its rivals. This change in turn makes residual demand steeper for other firms, so their optimal supply functions become steeper. Similarly, a decrease in n, for given choices of supply functions, makes total market supply steeper, so each firm's residual demand, and hence optimal supply function, becomes steeper. Hence increasing c, decreasing m, or decreasing n makes the equilibrium supply functions steeper. Increasing c or decreasing n raises industry price and lowers industry output for any given realization of E. However, decreasing m raises price by a smaller proportion than the fall in m and so raises industry output. (Multiplying m by a factor (1/X) < 1 multiplies the market-clearing price for any given output by a factor X, by rotating the demand curve upwards about a fixed horizontal intercept for given e. Therefore, we are interested in whether the equilibrium price increases by more or less than a factor X.) To understand this result, observe that making both marginal cost and demand steeper by a factor X (i.e. multiplying c by X and m by 1/X) also makes the equilibrium supply functions steeper, and so raises price, by the same factor and leaves output unchanged. Therefore, decreasing m has the opposite effect on the level of price relative to demand and on the level of output as increasing c. To summarize, industry price is higher and industry output lower the smaller is the number of firms (lower n) and the steeper is the marginal cost curve relative to the demand curve (larger cm).17
These comparative statics effects are shared by other oligopoly models. Perhaps more interesting is that the magnitudes of the effects are larger for changes in c and n, but smaller for changes in m, than if firms competed by choosing from a set of supply functions of exogenously fixed slope. In our model, changes in these parameters, by affecting the slopes of the supply functions that firms adopt, indirectly affect market outcomes, in addition to directly affecting outcomes in a manner analogous to that in the standard models of Cournot and Bertrand and in Vives (1986) , where supply function slopes are exogenously fixed. To confirm that changes in supply function slopes affect equilibrium outputs, observe that any linear SFE consists of the supply functions that firms would choose in the Nash equilibrium of a game in which they were restricted to supply functions of this slope, and as this slope increases, the Nash equilibrium outputs are reduced. (Each point (po, 2SO) on a demand curve D( p, E) is the unique Nash equilibrium in linear supply functions of slope f( po, SO); Claim 3 thus implies that smaller outputs correspond to steeper supply functions.) Hence, since an increase in c or a decrease in n lowers total equilibrium output when the slope of supply functions is exogenously fixed, these comparative statics effects are reinforced by the increase in the slope of the supply functions adopted.'8 On the other hand, a decrease in m reduces output through its effect of increasing the slope of equilibrium supply functions, but its overall effect is nevertheless to increase output.
DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
This section sketches the extension of the model of supply function competition to the case of a differentiated products duopoly, in which firms' demands are subject to a common, ex ante unobservable shock. We assume that the firms are symmetric and that the shock translates the demand curves horizontally, so the demand system is 
Pi
Differentiating with respect to pi and substituting for 4{ from above, the
In the linear SFE, the difference between equilibrium price and marginal cost converges to 0 at rate 1/n2, for given E. In Cournot competition, the order of magnitude is 1/n, while in Vives (1986) , it is l/n2. As in Vives (1986), when n -oo, there are two distinct effects on the SFE, each of which drives the price-cost margin to 0 at rate 1/n. First, residual demand for each firm shifts inward, and the perceived elasticity of residual demand goes to infinity. Second, residual demand becomes flatter because, with each firm choosing an upward-sloping supply function, the total supply curve of the rest of the industry becomes flatter. (Only the first of these effects is present in the Cournot model.) In the SFE, in contrast to Vives (1986) , the increase in the slope of the equilibrium supply functions as n increases also shrinks the price-cost margin, but because this slope remains finite, this third effect does not change the order of magnitude of the price-cost margin. The differential equation (14) As with perfect substitutes, increasing the slope of demand (by proportionately increasing b, and b2, leaving the horizontal intercept unchanged for given e) raises equilibrium outputs.
We can examine the effect of reducing the degree of product differentiation, while keeping the market size constant, by increasing b, and b2 while holding b-b2 constant."9 This change makes the equilibrium supply functions flatter and increases outputs. In contrast to the case when firms compete with supply functions of exogenously fixed slope, competition is intensified both directly, by the greater similarity of the products, and also indirectly, by the fact that firms choose flatter supply functions.
CONCLUSION
Our objectives in this paper have been to develop a richer model of competition in oligopoly, and at the same time to resolve the competing predictions of different models (Cournot, Bertrand, etc.), in which firms are restricted to using particular, exogenously determined strategic variables (fixed prices, fixed quantities, etc.).
In the presence of uncertainty, firms will wish to adopt supply functions as strategic variables. We have presented conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in supply functions (SFE) exists for a symmetric n-firm oligopoly producing a homogeneous good, have shown that all equilibria are symmetric, and have found (stronger) sufficient conditions for uniqueness. When the demand uncertainty has unbounded support, then even if the SFE is not unique, for any given realization of the market demand curve, the set of equihbrium outcomes along it is a connected set, and each point in the set is supported by a unique supply function. Furthermore, under this assumption on the demand uncertainty, any SFE outcome corresponding to a given value of the demand shock is intermediate in terms of price, output, and profits between the outcomes that would result from Cournot and Bertrand competition if the value of the shock were known.
Recognizing that firms will adapt to exogenous uncertainty by choosing supply functions helps to resolve the indeterminacy of equilibrium in oligopoly models. Under uncertainty, firms have strict preferences over the set of possible strategic variables, because their strategic vanable (their supply function) must function well in many possible environments. This rules out almost all of the superabundance of Nash equilibria in supply functions under certainty, because the supply functions in these equilibria are not optimal except at a single point. In addition to determining how a firm's behavior will change in equilibrium with the exogenous demand shock, the chosen supply function also determines how the firm would respond out of equilibrium to a change in a rival's behavior. From this perspective, firms' selection of supply functions in an environment of 19Total market demand is q, + j = (b2 -bl)(pi +pj) + 2E, but the sensitivity of i's demand to a change in j's price increases as b2 (and bl) increase. uncertainty narrows down the set of possible residual demand curves that their rivals could face in equilibrium, and hence dramatically reduces the set of equilibria.
While our approach has been to model a game in which strategic variables (that is, the form of firms' supply functions) are determined endogenously in Nash equilibrium, rather than to propose a new equilibrium concept, our objective of resolving the indeterminacy of equilibrium in oligopoly is shared by the literature on consistent conjectures equilibria (see, for example, Bresnahan (1981 Bresnahan ( ,1983 ). That literature view this indeterminacy as arising from the arbitrariness of firms' conjectures about their rivals' responses to deviations and attempts to remove this arbitrariness through imposition of some form of consistency condition on conjectures. However, while the equilibrium concept has been expressed in game-theoretic terms (Bresnahan (1983), Robson (1983) ), the approach relies implicitly on firms' being uncertain, even in equilibrium, about their rivals' behavior, and this uncertainty is neither explained nor explicitly modeled. As a result the justification for the consistency condition is unclear.20 In contrast, our approach of motivating supply function strategies by adaptation to exogenous uncertainty and focusing on Nash equilibria in these strategies provides, in our view, a sounder game-theoretic model of oligopoly.
The predictions of our model could be tested by adapting the methodology developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) for empirically estimating the degree of market power in an oligopolistic industry, even when the demand and marginal cost curves must be estimated as well. (By the "degree of market power," Bresnahan and Lau mean the slope of a firm's perceived marginal revenue curve, which in our model is endogenously determined by the competitors' equilibrium supply functions.)
We have modeled the endogenous determination of strategic variables in a very general way, allowing firms to choose any function relating their output to their price: we believe that competition in oligopoly is through choices that are better approximated by supply functions than by fixing either price or quantity at a given level and letting the other variable absorb all of the adjustment required for market clearing, as in standard Bertrand and Cournot models. Nevertheless, models in which firms fix prices or quantities are convenient analytically. Our work can be interpreted as suggesting under what conditions a Bertrand or a Coumot model is a better approximation to oligopolistic competition.21 With a 20Both the stronger and the weaker versions of Bresnahan's consistent conjectures equilibrium concept have other drawbacks: Robson (1983) showed that the stronger equilibrium, proposed by Bresnahan (1981), may not exist, and Klemperer and Meyer (1988) showed that any point at which firms earn nonnegative profits can be supported by an infinity of consistent conjectures equilibria of the weaker form defined in Bresnahan (1983) . 21Viewed in this light, our analysis generalizes Klemperer and Meyer (1986) , in which firms were restricted to choosing either a fixed price (horizontal supply function) or a fixed quantity (vertical supply function) and results similar to those here were obtained: there an increase in the slope of the marginal cost curve, a convexification of the demand curve, and an increase in the effect of the demand shock at higher, relative to lower, prices all made firms more likely to select quantities as equilibrium strategic variables. small number of firms, differentiated products, additive demand uncertainty, and a marginal cost curve that is steep relative to demand, quantity-setting models may be better approximations than price-setting models. With a larger number of firms, more homogeneous products, relatively greater demand uncertainty at lower prices, and a marginal cost curve that is flatter relative to demand, price-setting models may be closer to the truth. 
